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Energy Federalism: Who Decides?*
What is the Issue?
Questions about energy are acquiring renewed urgency in the 21st 
Century. Some go to the heart of our system of federalism, or the 
way authority has been divided between central and more local 
political units. What is at stake? According to one author, it matters 
who the “decider” is: “the choice of regulatory forum often seems 
to determine the outcome of the controversy. That may explain 
why Americans have traditionally shed so much metaphorical and 
genuine blood deciding what are essentially jurisdictional disputes 
between governmental institutions.”1
Background
Decisions about energy are increasingly 
important because of the depletion 
of low cost oil, new energy extraction 
technologies, and increased awareness 
of the link between energy and climate 
change, all in the absence of a broad based 
consensus over federal energy policy. 
Decisions on these issues are affected 
by our nation’s political divide. Mostly 
“conservative” and anti- (or anti-“big”) 
government forces mobilized for more local 
devolution, deregulation, privatization, and 
property rights. In contrast, “progressive” 
movements evolved in response to increased globalization (of 
economic and environmental issues) and personalization (e.g. of 
communications technology) by promoting global governance in 
some arenas and local empowerment in others. This brief illustrates 
these tensions with a couple specific cases.
High Volume Hydraulic Fracturing (HVHF) for  
Natural Gas Extraction
The first example involves hydraulic fracturing, a controversial 
technology used to extract oil and gas from “unconventional” 
reserves located in shale and other rocks. State authority dominates 
the regulation of natural gas drilling, but is currently being contested 
by both federal and local government interests. In general, the 
challenges to state control are led by critics of HVHF who suggest 
that regulations imposed by the federal or their own local government 
would be stricter than those imposed by states. By the same token 
advocates of maintaining state authority tend to favor HVHF. 
Though state regulation dominates, federal authority applies to 
some aspects of HVHF and many other energy issues. However, 
federal regulators have exempted key elements of oil and gas 
operations from national jurisdiction, determining that select federal 
regulations were “unwarranted” in light of existing state and federal 
regulation. One example, the 2005 “Energy Policy Act”, exempts 
the underground injection of most hydraulic fracturing fluids from 
regulation under the Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA), i.e. it defers 
to state regulation. However, this controversial provision of the 2005 
law has promoted vigorous challenges to the current distribution 
of regulatory authority. Democratic critics in Congress introduced 
the 2009 “FRAC Act” to include hydraulic fracturing as a federally 
regulated activity under the SDWA. However, this act has not, to 
date, passed either the House or the Senate. In the meantime, more 
than one state official has already complained about perceived federal 
trespass on their turf. 
The authority of states to regulate 
hydraulic fracturing is also being 
challenged by local governments. In several 
Northeastern shale gas rich states, state 
law appears to “supercede all local laws or 
ordinances relating to the regulation of the 
oil, gas and solution mining industries”2 
However, in New York State (NYS) alone, at 
least two dozen communities have adopted 
seemingly contrary bans or moratoria. The 
precise meaning of such language -- whereby 
the state preempts local government 
authority to control oil and gas operations -- 
and the corresponding validity of local laws, is still being interpreted 
by each state’s courts. The stage of litigation, appeal, and legal clarity 
on this issue differs in each state. In none has it been finally settled. 
Power Plant Siting and Electricity Transmission
Jurisdiction over power plant siting and the transmission of electricity 
have received relatively little attention from the popular media, but 
they have received extensive attention from energy industries, legal 
scholars, industry analysts, affected communities, and various policy 
making bodies. 
The Energy Act of 2005 stipulated that a federal agency (FERC) 
has siting authority for certain electric transmission lines, and 
for all natural gas pipelines destined for resale markets involving 
interstate commerce. Fossil and renewably fueled electricity is 
most often generated in areas remote from its location of use. The 
Energy Act of 2005 was intended to reduce state and local obstacles, 
including procedural friction and political resistance, to transmission 
investment. The large investment upgrades in transmission 
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infrastructure are projected to be necessary to deliver new sources 
of electricity. 
Under federal law (16 U.S.C. § 824p), the FERC may “designate 
a national interest electric transmission corridor” and may trump 
state siting authority for a variety of reasons, including lack of state 
authority to account for “interstate benefits” or state failure to issue 
permits that would reduce interstate “transmission congestion” in a 
reasonable time and manner. This “backstop” permitting authority of 
FERC has yet to be used and some question whether it will ever be 
effective. Supporters of grid modernization in the electricity industry 
advocate strengthening FERC’s authority even further. Others remain 
concerned that good decisions require state and local oversight. 
Similar issues surround the distribution of authority over the siting 
of electricity generating facilities. In NYS, for example, recently 
passed legislation shifts jurisdiction to the state and away from local 
government for facilities rated 25-80 MW capacity. Though not 
differentiated by fuel source, the implications for wind energy are 
noteworthy. Advocates and opponents alike see the legislation as an 
effort to facilitate the siting of new wind farms, in part by reducing 
the influence of localized opposition that holds greater sway under 
local government “home rule.” 
Energy Federalism
These examples of contested regulation show that the federalism 
status quo is being questioned in the energy sector. What criteria, 
other than short term political advantage on a particular issue, are or 
should be used to evaluate whether authority should be assigned to 
local, state, or federal government, or some combination? Sovocool3 
offers a list of organizing principles derived from theories of 
“environmental federalism” that can be applied to energy decision-
making:
Claimed benefits of centralized authority:
Internalizes externalities (e.g. when pollution crosses political 
boundaries). Costs and benefits are borne by groups represented 
by the deciding authority, promoting fairness and better economic 
choices. 
Consistent and uniform regulation. Costs of regulation are reduced 
for businesses active in multiple communities. Larger scale enables 
more efficient administration and enforcement, and improves the 
science on which regulation is based. 
Negotiating power. Centralization assembles power, reducing the 
mismatch between small state and local governments and large 
corporate or other special interests.
Prevents a race to the bottom. Centralized minimum standards of 
human health and environmental quality can remove the incentive 
for state and local governments to compete for investment by 
lowering standards. 
Claimed benefits of decentralized authority:
Experimentation and innovation. Decentralized authority stimulates 
a race to the top as state and local governments compete to adopt 
successful innovation.
Reduced chance of regulatory capture. Powerful interests have a 
harder time influencing, or “capturing”, separate agencies than a 
single centralized one.
Flexibility. Approaches can be more responsive and easily tailored to 
variable state and local conditions.
Democracy is enhanced. Government closer to the people facilitates 
more meaningful democratic participation and citizenship. 
Claimed benefits of shared but discrete authority (“layer cake 
federalism”):
Different governments are best suited to different roles. Some decisions 
(e.g. about small scale energy facilities) have only local impacts 
and are best made by decentralized government. Others (e.g. about 
interstate transmission of electricity) affect multiple jurisdictions 
and require a central, mediating authority.
Claimed benefits of shared, overlapping authority  
(cooperative or “marble cake” federalism): 
Creative, cross-jurisdictional dialogue: Shared authority enables 
creative interaction between different perspectives, supporting 
coordination, innovation, participation, and partnership. Learning 
and best practice solutions are promoted. 
Backup authority: Overlap provides a kind of insurance, as protection 
remains even if one part of the system fails. 
Accountability: The alertness of each regulator increases with shared 
responsibility, and it is more difficult for a single special interest to 
have undue influence with multiple regulators. 
Best of both worlds: The advantages of centralized economies of scale 
and decentralized experimentation are combined, e.g. by setting 
central standards, but as a minimum only.
Conclusion
New Yorkers are “spilling blood” - in the metaphorical sense 
suggested above - over whether local, state or federal government 
should control the fate of hydraulic fracturing in NYS. Blood 
pressures have also risen over who should permit moderately sized 
electric generating facilities and control the siting of natural gas and 
electricity transmission corridors. Not infrequently, advocates who 
argue for or against federal or state or “home rule” in one context 
reflexively take the opposite position in another. This may make 
strategic sense in the heat of battle over specific policy decisions 
about particular energy technologies or fuels or sites. However, a 
danger exists for partisans and policy makers who fail to lift their 
line of sight above the battlefield. Unless principled arguments about 
the benefits and costs of rebalancing federalism are considered, the 
distribution of power and passion that lead to precedent and victory 
in one arena may well simply set the stage for defeat in another. 
Sovocool suggests that “marble cake” federalism is the best suited 
and most practical approach to energy policy making. Be that as it 
may, it should be evident that the claimed benefits of each approach 
he lists are more of a promise than a guarantee. The point of this 
Brief is not to identify a universally preferred structure of federalism, 
but to advocate that energy literacy engage with basic governance 
principles. This would require all involved to step back from the fray 
for a harder look at the implications of energy federalism for long 
term strategic concerns as well as short term tactical arguments.
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